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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the importance of a de-
fense system’s learning rates to fight against the self-propagating
class of malware such as worms and bots. To this end, we
introduce a new propagation model based on the interactions
between an adversary (and its agents) who wishes to construct a
zombie army of a specific size, and a defender taking advantage
of standard security tools and technologies such as honeypots
(HPs) and intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSes)
in the network environment. As time goes on, the defender can
incrementally learn from the collected/observed attack samples
(e.g., malware payloads), and therefore being able to generate
attack signatures. The generated signatures then are used for
filtering next attack traffic and thus containing the attacker’s
progress in its malware propagation mission. Using simulation
and numerical analysis, we evaluate the efficacy of signature
generation algorithms and in general any learning-based scheme
in bringing an adversary’s maneuvering in the environment to a
halt as an adversarial containment strategy.
Index Terms—Botnet, Malware propagation modeling, Self-
replicating code, Worms, Intrusion detection and prevention
system, Honeypots, Security games
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rise of advanced and novel malware (e.g., Stuxnet
worm [1], and WannaCry ransomware cryptoworm [2]) and
the expanding population of Internet residents, especially the
explosion of connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices, new
methods, and research for understanding malware behaviors
and jousting with sophisticated botnets seem to be crucial.
Of specific interest to us are two types of malware, worms
[3], and autonomous bots [4], mainly due to their wide-
ranging audience, and self-propagating characteristics. These
types of malware execute a “seek-and-infect” mission strategy.
For instance, a scanning worm conventionally infects a target
by utilizing vulnerability exploitation, and it automatically
probes the environment to independently propagate itself (or
modified copies of itself) from the infected machine to other
vulnerable hosts in a network. Consequently, a straightforward
way of assembling an army of infected hosts is spreading the
malicious code in the form of a scanning worm. This zombie
army which is also known as a botnet is indeed a collection
of compromised machines distributed over a network (usually
the Internet) and controlled by its originator (known as a
This work was funded by NSF grant CNS-1413996 “MACS: A Modular
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botmaster) through a command and control (C&C) structure
[5]. Afterward, these infiltrated workstations (bots) can be
managed for different malicious purposes including but not
limited to ransom campaigns, massive spam-marketing, large-
scale information harvesting and processing, click fraud, pay-
per installation, and, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) at-
tacks.
The never-ending battle between adversaries and system
defenders drives both parties to improve their methods and
technologies to enhance their chances of prosperity. On the
one hand, attackers and network penetrators come up with
new attack methods and evasion techniques to bypass (or
even deny) defensive systems in any possible manner. Code
obfuscation, session splicing, fragmentation attacks, string
matching and DDoS attacks [6] are among the most common
techniques used by the adversaries to decrease the attack detec-
tion probability or to increase the chances of attack prosperity.
An armored malware (e.g., a metamorphic or polymorphic
worm) buys itself more propagation time by being hard to
identify and disassemble. On the other hand, a large number of
studies on malware detection/prevention techniques, IDPSes,
and HP technologies have been carried out to present more
effective methods and designs to reach better accuracy and
performance [7–9]. For instance, fast and automatic signature
generation schemes are introduced to fight against even the
mightiest type of malware [10–16]. Some claim that they can
generate high-quality signatures (with negligible false alarm
rates) based on only a few malware samples1 usually captured
via honeypots or a heuristic flow classifier.
Although there exist various number of research for worm-
like malware propagation modeling, in addition to proposals
for containment strategies such as content-based filtering based
on automatic and distributed signature generation of the mal-
ware, the question unanswered here is how and why does
the malware spread, especially the kinds targeting a broad
audience, if it is the case that we can generate high quality
and reliable signatures, even for an armored malware?
Our Approach. To answer such questions, the effectiveness of
1E.g., see Hamsa [14] which only requires 100-500 malware samples in the
suspicious flow pool to reach a %5 false negative rate, even for a previously
unknown worm
content-based filtering strategies2 based on automatic signature
generation schemes must be studied. Hence, in this paper,
instead of presenting yet another malware detection/prevention
methodology, we revisit the spread of malware phenomenon,
especially the self-propagating ones such as worms and bots,
from a new perspective. We introduce a new model for
capturing the interactions of an adversary and its agents with
the defensive system during the early phases of a zombie
army construction. Unlike a malware propagator who usually
follows a passive attack strategy for malware distribution to
a broad audience, meaning that the attack technology usually
remains the same after unleashing the first few samples of
the malware, the defender can incrementally learn regarding
the attack technology (specifically, from observed malware
payloads). As time elapses, and the defender captures more
attack data, it can reach better detection rates and accuracy.
This learning rate indeed reflects into higher quality malware
signatures which can be used for online malicious traffic
filtering and hence malware containment purposes.
Contributions & Results. The main contributions of our work
can be summarized as follows:
• Motivated by the advances in networking infrastructure
and technologies such as the introduction of software-
defined networking (SDN), and also the widespread em-
brace of automated machine learning (AutoML) tech-
niques in different realms of networking and security
fields, we introduce a novel malware propagation model
called “learning-based model” suitable for today’s tech-
nologies and more advanced malware.
• The previous outdated models are mainly focused on
the attacker’s strategies (specifically target discovery and
scanning rates [17–19]), or in best cases, an ill-defined
cleaning of the infection or patching processes [20–22].
However, we show how the increased knowledge of the
defender can be taken into consideration by modeling
the learning rate of the defense system as a function
f(l) (which is the probability of detecting and filtering a
next malicious payload) where l represents the number of
malicious payloads for a specific exploit so far collected.
• The model leads to the development of an automatic self-
replicating malware containment strategy that prevents
the spread of the malware beyond its early stages of
propagation.
• We provide precise conditions on the convergence rates
of a learning-based signature generation algorithm that
determines whether the malware spread will ultimately
settle or not.
• We derive tight upper and lower bounds on the total
number of hosts the malware propagator can infect.
• The model is general enough and enables us to evaluate
the effectiveness of learning-based signature generation
schemes and containment strategies.
2As one of the most effective and feasible solutions to tackle the spreading
of worm-like malware
• We study learning functions of the form f(l) = ( A
A+l )
α in
which A is considered to slow down the learning process,
and α is the amplification factor in the learning. This
enables us to capture characteristics of both yesteryears
malware (e.g., a monomorphic worm) and also today’s
more advanced ones such as polymorphic malware.
• Numerical analysis and simulation results show that
regardless of attacker’s scanning rates, with a proper
learning function that converges fast enough to 1, the
propagation will be contained and only a negligible
number of susceptible population will be infected.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section II briefly reviews existing worm-like malware’s
propagation models in addition to automatic signature genera-
tion schemes and content-based filtering of such malware. We
present a new learning-based propagation model in section
III followed by the corresponding numerical analysis and
simulation results of this model for various learning functions
in section IV, and V. We finally conclude the paper and discuss
future works in section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The three potential solutions to mitigate a self-replicating
code’s rampancy are prevention, treatment, and containment
strategies. The prevention and treatment schemes can be sum-
marized as following secure software/application development
procedures in hopes of having vulnerability-free software,
or patching/updating vulnerable systems as soon as vulner-
abilities are discovered. Unlike the containment techniques,
such conducts are usually vital for pre/post incident time
and not during the period of an incident. In this section, we
first review content-based filtering and automatic signature
generation schemes as the most effective containment strategy
[23] to hinder the spread of a malware. Moreover, we study
some of the most relevant propagation models existing in the
literature before presenting our model.
A. Content-based filtering and Automatic Signature Genera-
tion Schemes
Human interventions and attack response time must be
minimized in order to be able to prevent widespread infections.
To this end, automatic, distributed and real-time detection and
containment strategies, even for the mightiest type of worm,
i.e., a polymorphic one, are introduced in the literature. Such
signature-based detection and prevention techniques are of
particular interest of this work as “an ounce of prevention
is worth a pound of cure” meaning that such containment
strategies can be very efficient for thwarting the spread of
malware, especially during the early phases of a botnet
construction and worm propagation, only if a high-quality
signature can be generated (automatically). Such signatures
can be created based on various attributes (e.g., length of
the fields or invariant substrings of the byte sequences) of
a class of malware, and later these signatures will be used
for content-based malicious traffic filtering (even for extreme
cases such as previously unknown malware or an armored
one, e.g., a polymorphic worm). While designing a new
automatic signature generation scheme is not the objective of
this manuscript, here we review the most notable works in this
area in order to better understand such schemes especially their
architecture so that we can build a realistic propagation model
based on a general learning algorithm (on which the signature
generator is built upon) which we explain in later sections.
Autograph [10] is one of the first proposals for automatic
(and optionally distributed) signature generation for a poly-
morphic worm, utilizing a naive portscan-based flow classifier
(for TCP worms) to lessen the volume of traffic on which it
performs a content-prevalence analysis. The flow classification
enables Autograph to construct a suspicious flow pool on
which it executes TCP flow reassembly for the payloads and
outputs the most frequently occurring byte sequences across
the flows as signatures. EarlyBird [13] uses a similar approach
as Autograph in generating signatures by taking advantage of
Rabin fingerprints.
On the other hand, Polygraph [11] forms signatures that
consist of multiple disjoint content substrings to address the
inefficiency of single, contiguous string-based signature gen-
eration techniques (such as Honeycomb [12], EarlyBird, and
Autograph). Its underlying assumption for signature generation
is that for a real-world exploit to function correctly, various
invariant substrings must often be present in all alternatives of
a malware payload; and these substrings typically correspond
to return addresses, protocol framing, and in some cases, de-
fectively obfuscated code. Hamsa [14] is another fast content-
based signature generation method which generates multiset
tokens as signatures. In comparison with Polygraph, it can
provide better attack resilience and noise tolerance (accuracy).
PolyTree [15] can show how the worm variants evolve and
make the signature refinement task upon a new worm sample
arrival quick using an incremental signature tree construction.
This is based on the observation that worm signatures are
related and a tree structure can properly reflect their familial
resemblance which enables organizing the extracted signatures
from worm samples into a tree structure. Unlike the aforemen-
tioned proposals which generate exploit-specific signatures,
the paper in [16] presented an automatic vulnerability-driven
network-based length-based signature generator called LESG
for zero-day polymorphic worms exploiting buffer overflow
vulnerabilities based on the fact that specific protocol fields in
such attacks are usually longer than those in a conventional
protocol usage.
B. Propagation Modeling and Estimating a Botnet Size
In malware propagation models, possible states concerning
vulnerable population during a malware attack are susceptible
(S), infectious (I), and recovered (R). According to a host’s
state at different times, and based on the transition between
such states, malware propagation models can be categorized
into three classes: if a host can only have one of the susceptible
or infectious states and not being able to be recovered after
an infection, the model is called susceptible-infectious (SI).
If the model considers a permanent revival for an infected
machine, meaning that the host remains in an immune state
after the recovery process, the model is called susceptible-
infectious-recovered (SIR) and finally if there is the chance
of being infected again after a recovery the model is called
susceptible-infectious-susceptible (SIS).
The classical simple epidemic model which is an SI model-
ing is the most commonly used model in the literature and can
be simply described by the following differential equation in
which k denotes the total number of vulnerable nodes to the
epidemic (i.e., the susceptible population), and at each time
step, the so far infectious hosts i(t) propagate the epidemic
with a constant rate β.
di(t)
dt
= βi(t)[k − i(t)] (1)
An extension to the classical simple epidemic model is
the Kermack-McKendrick model (also known as the classical
general epidemic model [24]) which is one of the mostly used
SIR models in the literature. In this modeling, the effects of
a removal process in the infectious hosts population is taken
into consideration. Consider r(t) as the number of removed
hosts from previously infected hosts, and ζ as the constant
rate of removal, hence, the Kermack-McKendrick model can
be expressed by:
di(t)
dt
= βi(t)[k − i(t)− r(t)] −
dr(t)
dt
(2)
where
dr(t)
dt
= ζi(t).
Another proposal based on Kermack-McKendrick model
is [22] in which it provides a diurnal model for different
time zones for botnet propagation modeling by introducing
a correction factor α(t) (“the diurnal shaping function”) in
the total number of online (available) hosts based on the time
region. Therefore the diurnal worm propagation model can be
represented by:
di(t)
dt
= βα2(t)i(t)[k(t) − i(t)− r(t)] − ζα(t)i(t) (3)
The two-factor model [20] is as an extension to Kermack-
McKendrick’s model which enhances it in two manners. First,
it separates the removal process into two parts, one for the
elimination of infectious hosts (due to cleaning) and the other
for purging the susceptible population (due to patching and
system updates). Second, it considers a time-varying infection
rate to take worm traffic’s impact on the network infrastructure
into consideration (e.g., congestion in the network).
di(t)
dt
= β(t)i(t)[k(t) − i(t)− (r(t) + q(t))]−
dr(t)
dt
(4)
where
dr(t)
dt
= ζi(t), and q(t) denotes the number of removed
hosts from the susceptible population.
Analytical active worm propagation model (AAWP) which
is a similar approach in the discrete time setting is presented
in [21].
Stochastic modeling of active worms is another line of
research in this area. Sellke et al. [18] model the prop-
agation of the malware through a branching process, i.e.,
each infected machine in one generation will independently
produce some random number of infected machines in next-
generation according to a fixed probability distribution. The
model can determine the extinction condition of the malware
and provide an upper bound on the total number of infected
hosts. Rohloff et al. [19] used a simple stochastic density-
dependent Markov jump process to model worm propagation.
Each state in the chain represents the number of so far infected
machines i(t), in addition to the total number of remaining
susceptible population s(t). The model does not consider any
removal/cleaning actions meaning that the total number of
vulnerable hosts k = i(t) + s(t) is always constant at each
transition of the Markov chain. The time it takes for this chain
to reach its absorbing state is calculated. For more information
regarding malware propagation models we refer to the survey
presented in [25].
The models mentioned above mainly focus on the treatment
processes –such as patching a susceptible node or cleaning
an infected machine– for vulnerable population and infection
rate reduction purposes. In practice, these treatment strategies,
however, are not suitable for the expeditious spread of the
malware and therefore short-term reliefs for an outbreak.
Moore et al. [23] showed that a content-based filtering strategy
is the most vital containment strategy to limit the spread of
the malware via isolating it from the susceptible population.
Therefore, in this paper, we mainly focus on the containment
solutions made possible based on a defense system’s learning
engine which makes the propagation of the epidemic more
difficult. Valizadeh and van Dijk [26] originated the notion of
learning in Markov-based cyber-attack modeling and described
a general “game of consequences” in which the attacker’s
chances of making a progressive move in the game depends
on its previous actions. This notion of learning has been previ-
ously used in learning-based signature generation schemes for
the polymorphic worm but never been applied to propagation
models. The advances in network technologies (especially
SDN) and automated machine learning (AutoML) motivate us
to take advantage of such learning mechanisms and introduce a
new learning-based propagation modeling suitable for today’s
and future’s infrastructure and technology.
Moreover, the most critical shortcoming of the traditional
models is that they suffer from not taking both parties’ capa-
bilities, actions and strategies into consideration for the model
development. Therefore, these static models are incapable of
representing the dynamic nature of today’s network attack-
defense scenarios. Our modeling differs from the previously
mentioned models in the sense that as the time elapses, we
can take enhanced attack/defense strategies into consideration
by recognizing the players’ interactions as a learning pro-
cess, especially from the defense systems’ perspective. This
presented framework enables us to explicitly study how the
learning rates of a defense system can affect future interplays
of the players and their probability of success in the malware
propagation game. Moreover, instead of considering an ill-
defined removal/cleaning rate, we can describe where the
containment process could come from by considering an
incremental learning mechanism for the defender.
III. A LEARNING-BASED PROPAGATION MODEL
In this section, we study how a content-based filtering
strategy–which utilizes a general learning-based signature gen-
eration scheme– can play a role in containing the propagation
of a self-replicating code. More specifically, regardless of
the limits on the accuracy of any learning-based automatic
signature generation algorithm, we study the efficacy of such
schemes in ceasing the propagation of the malware under the
assumption of their constructability.
To understand the effect of a defense system’s learning
engine on the containment of the malware, we model the de-
fender’s learning engine (i.e., a signature generator algorithm)
as a function f , which takes so far collected/observed suspi-
cious traffic l (i.e., attack payloads) and outputs a signature
for that class of malware. This generated signature is then
used for online content-based traffic filtering in which each
incoming malware traffic can be filtered with probability f(l)
(true positive) or with 1 − f(l) the system fails in detecting
a malicious packet (or it falsely labels it as benign, i.e., false
negative). Later, we briefly discuss the occurrence of false
positives in the model. Moreover, we are interested in the
infection modeling during the Window of Vulnerability (WoV)
time as the number of vulnerable systems is not yet shrunken
to insignificance and the attackers exploit is useful in this
period. This means that we do not take patching and cleaning
of the susceptible and infected population into consideration.
A. Idealized Deployment, Network and Learning Model
We consider a logically centralized defense system (e.g.,
an IDPS) employed in the network, that is the containment
system is universally deployed within the address space, and
the learning engine works with all the observed/collected infor-
mation regarding the worm infections (i.e., samples) and then
distribute the generated signatures to defense system agents
(e.g., edge routers, inline network-based intrusion detection
systems (NIDS)). Similar to [27], we also consider that the
learning algorithm will update its internal state after observing
each new incoming batch of data, and these updates will be
made over all of the so far accumulated samples. In this
regard, with these updates, the learning engine might be able
to find a high-quality signature over a more extended period,
while without such updates, no learning would be possible.
Moreover, we assume that the signature generation task on
the accumulated samples is performed with no delay. Also,
the signature distribution to the defense agents will be done
immediately.
Automatic signature generation schemes (e.g., see [10, 11,
14, 15]) commonly take advantage of a heuristic flow classifier
for constructing a suspicious flow pool in order to reduce the
volume of traffic on which further analysis must be performed.
Therefore, we also consider that a copy of traffic is given
to a flow classifier for suspicious flow pool construction.
For simplicity and generality, however, we model the defense
system’s classifier and traffic analysis task as a probabilistic
sampling process [28] in which each malicious packet can be
sampled with probability λ. Note that λ reflects the classifier’s
accuracy in which it is the probability that an incoming
packet will be marked as suspicious traffic conditioned on
the fact that it is indeed malicious. The captured payloads
from the classifier are given to the signature generator engine
for signature generation. The generated signatures then are
used for the inline packet filtering by the defense system.
This allows us not to be concerned about the transmission
protocol (TCP/UDP), and in general more stealthier propaga-
tion schemes (e.g., second channel delivery) which are usually
more robust against anomaly-based detection systems, as they
will not trigger any events during the propagation3.
One very common problem among any IDPS is the in-
ability to provide absolutely complete and accurate detection
rates. This incompleteness and inaccuracy usually lead to the
occurrence of a false detection of a malicious activity as
benign or vice versa. Due to the existence of false alarms
(especially false positives), it is a common practice not to
utilize black/whitelisting prevention policies for the IDPS.
This means that we do not care about stealthy attacks in
which the attacker can conceal its real identity and disguise
the source of attack traffic to decrease the chance of being
located through common known practices such as IP address
spoofing, use of proxies, etc. However, false positives (labeling
a benign packet/activity as suspicious on the classifier level
or malicious for inline filtering) play an essential role in
the accuracy of the generated signatures and therefore the
normal operations of the network in which the defense system
is implemented. Note that in our model, false positives can
occur on two levels. First, the classifier may mark a benign
packet as suspicious which eventually could lead to inaccurate
signatures or taking a long time to generate true signatures. To
address this problem, we consider a deceleration factor in our
modeling to take the impact of such false positives in delaying
the signature generation into consideration. Second, since the
generated signatures are used for online filtering of incoming
packets, a false positive at this level may drop a benign packet
at the network level. However, notice that such incidents do
not impact the accuracy of our model, i.e., the total number
of infected nodes at any instance of time will not be affected.
B. A Learning-based Malware Propagation and Containment
Model
Our goal is to show that a sufficiently increasing learning
rate will stop malware from propagating and only a few
3Note that this is a practical assumption as the most common form of a
self-replicating code found in the wild is a self-carried (malware payload is
transferred in a packet by itself) malware which, regardless of the transmission
scheme (TCP or UDP) utilizes a blind scan strategy as its target discovery
(see Table 1 in [29]).
number of susceptible nodes k will be infected. Consider the
SI modeling represented in (1), as follows
di(t)
dt
= η
k − i(t)
n
i(t),
where i(t) represents the number of infected nodes at time t,
n is the size of address space, and η is equal to the average
scanning rate of an infected machine. Rather than modeling
the above equation, let us assume that we already will be able
to bound i(t) to a number ≪ k so that
di(t)
dt
= p · i(t) (5)
would be a good approximation for some constant
p = ηk/n.
In fact this approximation gives the adversary an advantage
since η k−i(t)
n
i(t) ≤ pi(t) which makes the new differential
equation (5) a best case scenario for the adversary.
We adapt (5) to include prevention of infection: If the
defender gathers samples of malicious payloads at a certain
rate λ, then the defender collects λ · η · i(t) samples at time t.
Notice that unlike the previous models in which the higher the
scanning rate of the malware, the sooner the whole population
become infected, in our modeling, however, a high scanning
rate will also potentially provide more samples to the defense
system which can lead to constructing a valid signature sooner
and therefore holding the attack’s progress. If we denote the
number of samples collected up to time t by j(t), and defining
γ = λ · η, then j(t) satisfies
dj(t)
dt
= γ · i(t). (6)
The defender’s knowledge of how to recognize and prevent
malicious payloads increases as a result of observing and col-
lecting malicious traffic. We assume f(l) captures this learning
– with probability f(l), where l = j(t) is the number of
samples collected so far, the adversarial payload is prevented
from doing any harm. With probability 1−f(l) = 1−f(j(t)),
the payload may proceed and this leads to the following
adjustment of (5):
di(t)
dt
= p · i(t) · (1− f(j(t))). (7)
Equation (7) is the learning-based model and this is what we
study; It shows that in addition to hitting a vulnerable target,
an infected machine’s endeavors to infecting a new device by
submitting an ominous packet to the target must not get filtered
by the defense system.
We will analyze monotonically increasing learning rates of
the form
1− f(l) =
(
A
l +A
)α
for some exponent α and constant A. The exponent α reflects
how collected samples amplify the learning rate while constant
A is included to slow down the learning process, i.e., delayed
learning. In this fashion, the learning function can be adjusted
TABLE I
NOTATIONS IN THIS PAPER
Notation Explanation
n Total number of nodes in the address space
k Total number of vulnerable nodes (i.e., susceptible population)
η Average scanning rate of an infected machine
i(t) Total number of infected nodes at time t
f(l) Defender’s filtering probability based on its current knowledge of malware
λ Probability of marking an incoming malicious traffic as suspicious on classifier level
j(t) Total number of attack samples collected at time t
γ Average rate of attack sample collection by the defense system
α Amplification factor in learning
A Deceleration factor in learning
to take both yesteryears’ worms and today’s more advanced
malware’s characteristics into consideration in the model.
For instance, for a naive, monomorphic malware, which the
signature generation is more straightforward and can be done
based on only a few malware samples, a small slow-down
factor A and a large enough amplification factor α can be used
in the model to capture the swiftness of signature generation
task. On the other hand, for a more potent malware, e.g.,
polymorphic/metamorphic worms, a large slow-down factor
and small amplification factor can depict the hardness of
signature generation task when dealing with such malware.
Substituting 1− f(l) into (7) yields
di(t)
dt
= p · i(t) ·
(
A
j(t) +A
)α
. (8)
Now notice that (6) expresses i(t) as i(t) = j′(t)/γ where
j′(t) = dj(t)
dt
is the first derivative of j(t). By denoting j′′(t)
the second derivative of j(t) and substituting these into (8)
gives the final differential equation which we wish to solve:
j′′(t)/γ = p · j′(t)/γ ·
(
A
j(t) +A
)α
. (9)
We are interested in bounding j′(t)/γ = i(t). Initially,
j(0) = 0 and
j′(0) = γ · i(0) = γ,
meaning that there is a single infected node within the network
at time zero (patient zero) and the defender’s knowledge of the
attack is zero at the beginning (zero-day vulnerability/exploit).
We now present the following theorem (for the analysis and
the proof see the appendix) which provides lower and upper
bounds on the total number of nodes the attacker can infect.
Theorem 1: For α < 1, i(t) = Ω(t1−α). For α = 1, i(t) =
Ω(ln t). For α > 1,
i(t) ≤ 1 +
Ap
(α− 1)γ
.
Corollary 1: In order to contain the malware from prop-
agation, the convergence rate of a learning-based signature
generation scheme must have an amplification factor α > 1.
Corollary 2: For α > 1, we have:
• the number of nodes that will be infected is proportional
to the deceleration factor A.
• substituting p = ηk/n, and γ = λη, gives i(t) ≤
1 + A(α−1)λ(
k
n
) meaning that i(t) is independent from
the malware’s scanning rate η.
C. Model Extensions and Limitations
In this section, we briefly discuss some possible scenarios
which require further investigations or can be modeled through
the same methodology presented in this work. Where possible,
we provide general guidance for the curious reader on how
such cases can be analyzed with a few adjustments to the
model.
An adaptive adversary with multiple exploits: After
observing no progress in the malware propagation mission
(i.e., being contained with some limited number of agents),
an adaptive adversary may decide to improve and update its
attack technology. For instance, a bot herder can update the
malware binary on its bots for different purposes. This includes
enhancing and extending attack vectors and technologies by
adding new functionalities or evasion techniques, migrating
to different C&C servers, and considering recent and revised
exploits. Our framework, can also capture such strong and pos-
sibly well-funded adversary. From the attacker’s perspective,
each new exploit Ej (or in other words an enhanced attack
technology) should be associated with some probability pj (as
each exploit might correspond to a different set of vulnerable
nodes within the network). From the defender’s perspective,
the signature generator, if it cannot generate a single universal
signature which matches all the malware’s instances, must be
able to generate multiple signatures each of which matches
some subset of flows in the suspicious flow pool. Therefore,
multiple detection rate functions and learning rates fj should
be considered for each class of malware.
A deceptive attacker capable of misleading the learning
engine: There exist various attacks against signature genera-
tion schemes especially those with learning based on pattern
extraction (see [30–33]). Noise injection attacks in which the
attacker can systematically inject noise (or deliberately crafted
attack samples) in the training pool to mislead the defenders
learning engine are amongst the most notable challenges for
signature generation schemes in adversarial settings. In devel-
oping the learning-based model, we decided not to consider
a deceptive adversary since in practice, a malware propagator
usually follows a passive attack strategy for the propagation
of the malware with a broad audience (e.g., worms/bots),
meaning that the attack technology usually remains the same
after unleashing the first few samples of the malware. That is
the malware propagation game is not a dynamic interaction
between the attacker and the defender (especially from the
attacker’s perspective) and although such attacks are theoreti-
cally possible, they have not yet been observed in the wild. In
general, when dealing with a delusive adversary, the learning
rate of the defense system may not always be positive, and
the learning engines false positive rates should be taken into
consideration in the model. We leave this problem for future
studies and refer the reader to [27] which studies the signature
generation in adversarial settings and proves lower bounds
on the number of mistakes any pattern extraction learning
algorithm can take under common assumptions.
Host-level detection and prevention: When the malware
resides on a machine, it surely exhibits abnormal and erratic
behavior (both externals such as unusual port usage [34] and
internals such as irregular system call sequences [35]) on that
machine. Therefore, one possibility is taking the knowledge
gained at the host-level into consideration for the purpose of
attack/malware signature generation by means of monitoring
events on endpoint devices through a HIDS. Such signatures
can be generated based on the malware residual activity on
the target machine or the specific exploit/vulnerability used
by the adversary during the infection. Hence, a cumulative
function fh can be considered for the host-level signatures
which depends on the total number of so far infected machines.
Therefore, one can easily fine-tune the model to capture such
defensive scenarios by multiplying the adversary’s probability
of success at each time step pi with 1 − fh(i) meaning that
not only it must hit the right target (i.e., a vulnerable host), the
malware should not be neutralized too at the host level. The
fh function gets updated once a new node becomes infected.
There exist proposals for combined detection methods, i.e.,
taking both host-level and network-level information into
consideration to fight against a worm/bot malware. For ex-
ample, [36] introduced a C&C protocol-independent detection
framework based on the combination of information gained
from both host and network level bot activities. We decided
not to count such strategies, since considering a universal host-
level defense system installed on all the network devices is an
unrealistic assumption in almost any practical situation.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEARNING-BASED
MODEL
The learning-based model is a general malware propagation
model with several parameters. Notice that when the learning
function is set to zero, i.e., f(.) = 0, and p = η k−i(t)
n
, we have
exactly the classical epidemic model. Although the effects of
cleaning the infection and patching the susceptible population
can be easily included in the model, we decided to ignore such
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Fig. 1. No learning, classical epidemic model
conducts since they have been well studied in the literature.
Also, we are interested in evaluating the impacts of learning
even in the worst case scenarios for the defender (i.e., giving
a leg up to the attacker by considering p = supi pi).
For the purpose of illustration, we consider a hypothetical
polymorphic worm, propagating in an address space of size
n = 232 (the entire IPv4 address space), while the size of
susceptible hosts’ population is k = 350, 000 . We assume a
blind scan strategy for which each infected host performs a
uniform scanning in the address space with an average rate
of 10, 188 scans per hour4. Moreover, we consider i(0) = 1,
and j(0) = 0, meaning that initially there exists one infected
machine at time zero, and the defender has no knowledge
regarding the attack (signature).
Although we proved upper and lower bounds on the total
number of infected nodes i(t) (see Theorem 1), for the general
learning-based model, we cannot get closed-form solutions.
Instead, we present numerical solutions of the differential
equation by using Python scipy.integrate package.
Fig. 1 depicts the solution of the learning-based model
when the learning parameter is set to zero. As mentioned
earlier, without a learning process the model is equivalent to
the classical epidemic model, and the saturation in the curve
depicts how the whole susceptible population will be infected
as time elapses.
We now study the impact of different parameters on the
total number of infected nodes in the learning-based model.
Fig. 2 depicts how the amplification factor α plays a
role in the modeling. The Ω(t0.5) and Ω(ln t) growth in
the population of infected hosts, for α = 0.5, and α = 1
respectively, can be seen from this plot which is consistent
with Theorem 1. In addition, notice that based on the theorem,
4These are the actual infamous codeRed1v2’s epidemic parameters [19].
We use these values only for the purpose of illustrations since the malware
is well studied and the parameters are already known.
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Fig. 2. Numerical solution of learning-based model for 1−f(l) = (1000/(l+
1000))α while λ = 0.001
for α > 1, the upper bound on the total number of infected
nodes is i(t) ≤ 1 + 82/(α − 1), which gives 83, and 42 for
α = 2 and 3 respectively. The value of i(t) for large enough
ts based on the numerical solution of the differential equation
for these two cases is 79.99 and 41.77 which is very close to
the upper bound.
In order to study the impact of other parameters (i.e., A,
and λ) in the learning-based model, we numerically solved
the differential equation for a constant α = 2 to see how the
other parameters play a role while the amplification factor is
set to an acceptable value. Fig. 3 depicts how the deceleration
factor A impacts i(t). In addition, the classifier’s accuracy’s
impact on the malware containment is shown in Fig. 4. As it
can be seen from this plot, the larger the λ, the sooner the
attacker’s progress is contained in the environment.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we want to see how reasonable is the as-
sumption of giving the adversary the advantage of p = supi pi
in our analysis by simulating the malware propagation process.
Algorithm 1 provides a high-level overview of malware’s self-
propagation activity. The simulator’s inputs are N ,K (set
of all nodes and susceptible nodes within the address space
respectively), and an adversarial exploit χ, in addition to the
filtering probability f(l) based on the so far collected samples
and the corresponding generated signatures, and the defense
system’s sampling rate λ. The termination rule is whether
the attacker compromises all the susceptible population or the
defender finds a true signature, that is f(l) = 1. Note that the
transmit method returns a tuple, i.e., if the transmitted packet
by an infected machine is filtered by the defense system or is
sampled at the flow classifier level. We simulate two different
scenarios. In the first scenario, we give the attacker a leg-
up by considering a constant p (i.e., p = supi pi = ηk/n;
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Fig. 3. Numerical solution of learning-based model for 1− f(l) = (A/(l+
A))2 while λ = 0.001
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Fig. 4. Numerical solution of learning-based model for 1−f(l) = (1000/(l+
1000))2 and different values of λ
this requires removing line 18 in Algorithm 1, and updating
the termination rule in line 19 to |I| == |K|). For the
second scenario, we consider p to be a function of so far
infected nodes (i.e., p = η(k − i(t))/n). For both cases,
we consider λ = 0.001 and a learning function of the form
1−f(l) = ( 1000
l+1000 )
2 as it satisfies the containment requirement
(i.e., α > 1). We again use the same propagation parameters
we used in the numerical analysis section only for the purpose
of illustration.
Fig. 5 shows the expected number of infected nodes among
100 simulation runs of the learning-based model. As it can be
seen from this figure, the infected population are almost the
same for both cases of p = supi pi, and p = p(i) meaning
Algorithm 1 Worm Propagation Simulator
1: function SIMULATOR(N ,K, χ, λ, f(.))
2: I = ∅; l = 0;
3: trueSignature = False;
4: thoroughInfection = False;
5: while not trueSignature and not thoroughInfection do
6: targetHost
$
←− probe(N );
7: filtered,sampled
f(l),λ
←−−−−transmit(χ,targetHost);
8: if sampled then
9: l += 1;
10: update f(l);
11: if f(l) == 1 then
12: trueSignature = True;
13: Output “Attacker cannot make any
progress!”;
14: end if
15: end if
16: if targetHost ∈ K and not filtered then
17: I = I ∪ targetHost;
18: K = K \ targetHost;
19: if |K| == 0 then
20: thoroughInfection = True;
21: Output “All vulnerable targets are in-
fected!”;
22: end if
23: end if
24: end while
25: end function
that η k−i(t)
n
≈ ηk/n = p is indeed a good approximation,
and considering a constant p in the model is a reasonable
assumption. Notice that this behavior was expected since in
the learning-based model as time elapses and f(l) → 1, the
chances of making progress for the malware propagator get
smaller and smaller (causes the saturation observed in the
plots). This means that the value of i(t) remains relatively
small in comparison to k and therefore i(t) can be bounded to
a number≪ k. Fig. 6 on the other hand, compares the result of
simulations with the numerical solution of the learning-based
model. For both scenarios, the upper bound on the size of the
infected population can be used as a tight estimate.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This presented work offers a fresh look at a 15-year old
research area (worm epidemic modeling). Although the self-
propagating class of malware may seem to be an old5 type of
a threat due to the decline in the “worm-like” common vul-
nerabilities exposures (CVEs) [2], the rise of self-propagating
ransomware (e.g., the WannaCry cryptoworm) and the highly
sophisticated malware such as Stuxnet worm attest that the net-
work vector is one of the few attack vectors which is capable
of passing the test of time. Taking advantage of the network
5The Morris worm was the first computer worm released on the Internet
on Nov. 1988, almost three decades ago.
vector and releasing the malware in a worm-like fashion,
meaning that the malware is equipped with a self-propagating
functionality, can provide the attackers a more potent malware
which is capable of causing widespread damage. This means
that the security community and professionals need to take the
self-propagating class of malware more serious to first better
understand such malware’s life cycle and then to be able to
come up with feasible solutions to tackle this problem. To
this end, we revisited the spread of malware phenomenon,
especially worm and bot type malware, from an entirely new
perspective. We have modeled the interactions of an adversary
and its agents with a defensive system during the construction
of a botnet as an incremental online learning process. By
focusing on the learning rate of a defense system’s learning
engine and signature generation algorithm, we presented a
novel and general propagation model called the learning-based
model suitable for today’s technology and infrastructure.
Unlike the existing outdated static modelings in this area,
the learning-based model is a dynamic one which can capture
the increased knowledge of the defender regarding the attack
technology into consideration for bringing next adversarial
actions into a halt. We studied monotonically increasing
learning functions for which we showed how different system
parameters play a role in the malware containment process. In
particular, we show that a learning function with amplification
factor α ≤ 1 allows the attacker to succeed in its zombie army
construction mission. The deceleration factor in learning must
remain small enough for the containment purposes meaning
that the defender cannot wait for too long learning about a used
exploit, and once the learning starts it must continue with an
associated detection probability converging fast enough to 1.
Using the learning-based model, we provided a precise bound
on the convergence of a learning-based scheme that ensures
that the worm propagation reaches minimal saturation in the
number of infected hosts during the worm’s life cycle. We have
shown that learning-based signature generation schemes can be
very effective for malware propagation containment purposes
only if their convergence rates satisfies our presented criteria.
The presented security analysis recommends 1 − f(l) ≤
O(l−α) with a proof for α > 1 in our framework, which
were consistent with the numerical analysis and simulation
results. The attacker needs to find just one exploit for which the
defender is too slow to react or too slow in learning. Instead of
focusing on higher scan rates, the attacker must invest in more
stealthier and robust target discovery schemes and malware
delivery techniques which would not raise suspicions, leading
to smaller value λs and therefore fewer attack samples will be
provided to the defense system.
A possible direction for future work is to estimate the
learning-based model’s parameters, especially the learning
rate f(l), based on the size of suspicious traffic pool (i.e.,
number of observed malicious payloads) given a “worst-case
adversary”. Our framework lays the foundation for such work
and allows to provide a worst-case probabilistic bound on
the number of compromised nodes based on the estimated
f(l) which in turn, offers guidance to the system defender in
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Fig. 5. Simulation of malware propagation for two cases: p = sup
i
pi, and p = p(i)
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Fig. 6. Comparing the total number of infected nodes based on simulations
(using Algorithm 1 with p = sup
i
pi) and numerical solution of learning-
based model for 1− f(l) = (1000/(l + 1000))2 while λ = 0.001
how to earmark its resources and use the model for damage
assessment and prediction purposes.
We believe our study can provide network security re-
searchers and architects valuable lessons and more robust
understandings of both attack and defense technologies con-
cerning malware with a broad audience. Besides, with the
advent of software-defined networking (SDN) in which the
entire network infrastructure can be controlled from a cen-
tralized software controller, and the embrace of AutoML in
defense technologies, new generations of traditional cyber
defense technologies (e.g., HPs, IDPSes, firewalls, etc.), which
are more capable, scalable and secure, are already being
introduced. This could be a new opportunity and a fresh start
to fight against the botnet phenomenon or the spreading of the
malware in general. For future work, we would like to evaluate
the performance of common automatic signature generation
schemes using real data from enterprise networks by porting
the learning-based containment mechanism to edge and local
routers, especially in a software-defined network environment.
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APPENDIX
In order to make the next derivations readable we introduce
y = j(t),
v = y′ = j′(t) = γ · i(t).
Differential equation (9) in terms of y and v after reordering
terms reads
y′′ = Aαp · v · (y +A)−α. (10)
We derive
y′′ = v′ =
dv
dt
=
dv
dy
dy
dt
= y′
dv
dy
= v
dv
dy
.
Substituting this expression into (10), dividing by v, and
multiplying with dy yields
dv = Aαp · (y +A)−α · dy.
Assuming α 6= 1, then taking integrals on the left and right
side gives the equation
v =
Aαp
1− α
· (y +A)1−α + c1 (11)
for some constant c1. For t = 0, we have y(0) = j(0) = 0
and v(0) = y′(0) = j′(0) = γ · i(0) = γ. Substituting this
into the above equation solves
c1 = γ +
Ap
α− 1
. (12)
Now we substitute v = dy
dt
into (11) and multiply both sides
with dt:
dy =
{
Aαp
1− α
· (y +A)1−α + c1
}
· dt. (13)
Equivalently, we have
dt =
{
Aαp
1− α
· (y +A)1−α + c1
}
−1
· dy.
Taking integrals on the left and right side gives the expression
t = c2 +
∫ y(t)
y=y(0)
{
Aαp
1− α
· (y + A)1−α + c1
}
−1
dy
for some constant c2. Substituting t = 0 gives c2 = 0 and
y(0) = j(0) = 0. Plugging in (12) proves
t =
∫ y(t)
y=0
{
Aαp
1− α
· (y +A)1−α + γ +
Ap
α− 1
}
−1
dy
=
α− 1
Ap
·
∫ y(t)
y=0
{
1− (y/A+ 1)1−α +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}
−1
dy.
As an immediate consequence we can take the derivative
(using the chain rule) with respect to t on both sides. This
shows that (this can also directly be concluded from (11))
1 =
α− 1
Ap
·
{
1− (y(t)/A + 1)1−α +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}
−1
· y′(t).
(14)
Notice that y(t) = j(t) is increasing (since j′(t) = γ ·i(t) ≥ 0)
with y(t) ≥ y(0) = 0. Therefore, if α > 1, then 0 ≤ (y(t)/A+
1)1−α ≤ 1 and{
1− (y(t)/A+ 1)1−α +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}
−1
≥
{
1 +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}
−1
.
Case I (α > 1): Substituting this into (14) yields for α > 1,
1 ≥
α− 1
Ap
·
{
1 +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}
−1
· y′(t)
proving
i(t) = y′(t)/γ ≤
Ap
α− 1
·
{
1 +
γ(α− 1)
Ap
}
/γ = 1+
Ap
(α− 1)γ
.
Case II (α < 1): As a second consequence of (14), we
derive for α < 1,
y′(t) =
Ap
α− 1
{
1− (y(t)/A+ 1)1−α
}
+ γ ≥ γ = y′(0).
(15)
Hence,
y(t) ≥ γ · t.
Substituting this back into (15), and noticing that i(t) =
y′(t)/γ gives
i(t) ≥
Ap
α− 1
{
1− (γ · t/A+ 1)1−α
}
/γ + 1 = Ω(t1−α).
This proves that only a learning rate with amplification α > 1
will prevent the malware from propagating to all k vulnerable
nodes.
Case III (α = 1): For completeness, if α = 1, then taking
integrals that led to (11) for α 6= 1, now lead to
dy
dt
= v = Ap ln(y +A) + c1 (16)
with
c1 = γ −Ap lnA.
Notice that y′(t) = Ap ln(y/A + 1) + γ ≥ γ and we use the
same argument as we did above for α < 1. We again have
y(t) ≥ γ · t and substituting this back gives
i(t) ≥ Ap/γ ln(γ · t/A+ 1) + 1 = Ω(ln t).
These lower bounds can be improved by recursively substitut-
ing lower bounds back into (15) and (16), respectively.
